Virtually nothing New Zealand tried against India came off in the 2026 Men’s T20 World Cup final.
New Zealand picking Neesham over McConchie
The T20 World Cup final in Ahmedabad was allotted the middle pitch. A mixture of red and black soil, this wicket has a reputation for producing bounce while not providing much assistance to spinners. Despite his ordinary tournament, New Zealand were thus probably right to pick Jacob Duffy.
It is not clear, however, why they picked Jimmy Neesham (who had an unremarkable World Cup until then) over Cole McConchie, whose only over stopped South Africa in their tracks in the semi-final, something from which they never recovered.
Three times in this World Cup had Abhishek Sharma failed to last the first overs bowled by off-spinners. This time, all he needed to do was play out some benign offerings from Glenn Phillips. Once he changed gear, New Zealand could not recall Phillips (though Mitchell Santner admitted at the post-match press conference that he was an option when Tilak Varma and Shivam Dube got together), and did not have another off-spinner.
Final, India vs New Zealand
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Taking off Matt Henry after one over
India began cautiously, taking only 12 off the first two overs. At this point, Santner replaced Matt Henry with Duffy, who had gone for 6-0-80-1 in his two games against Full Member nations and had not played since the first round. He is a fine bowler who had an excellent 2025, but he had not been having a good tournament.
Santner probably chose to get one over from Duffy out of the way before the Indians pressed the accelerator. Or perhaps he wanted to mix things up (he made five bowling changes inside the powerplay). It backfired: the over went for 15, but more importantly, Abhishek found the long-awaited runs. Henry returned for the fifth over, but by then it was too late: India were already 51-0 in four.
How many wides are too many wides?
It can be argued that bowling wide of the off-stump is a logical (and often effective) tactic, especially when the batting side goes on rampage inside the powerplay or at the death. Three wides and a dot ball are, after all, more economical than a boundary.
But did New Zealand overdo it? Duffy bowled one in the third over, Lockie Ferguson three in the fourth, and Henry four in the fifth. Three of these eight wides were down the leg-side, but the other five were clearly part of a plan.
Even that would have been fine, but the wides served little purpose: India reached 92-0 after the powerplay, and New Zealand spent the rest of the night trying to catch up with them. They did not bowl another wide in the entire innings.
Overdoing the slower ball
The wide ball was not the only tactic New Zealand overdid in the early overs. Duffy bowled a slower ball in the third over. Ferguson bowled two in the fourth. Henry, two more in the fifth.
Unfortunately, two of these were wides, while the Indian openers picked the other three with ease and dispatched them for fours or sixes. By the time the fifth over ended, the slower ball was no longer a surprise: the New Zealand fast bowlers did not attempt an encore until the death overs.
Neesham for the last over
At 203-1 in 15 overs, India had their eyes on a truly colossal target. That it did not happen (well, by India’s standards) was largely because of the 16th over, where Neesham took out three wickets.
Duffy backed up with an excellent over, and India were suddenly 211-4 in 17 overs. Neesham bowled the 18th over as well, and kept it to 220-4. Santner played his Henry card, and India reached 231-4.
One can understand Santner’s temptation to ask Neesham to bowl the final over instead of the specialists, Ferguson or Duffy: he chose match-day form over reputation. Like most things for New Zealand on the night, it backfired.
Axar Patel’s “promotion” and New Zealand’s rigidity
Two games ago, Suryakumar Yadav had brought Axar Patel early in the innings against Shai Hope and Roston Chase and gave him three overs on the trot. Faced with two right-handed openers again, he did the same in the third over – and took out Finn Allen and Glenn Phillips.
Despite that and Varun Chakravarthy’s below-the-best run, New Zealand never tried to break their monotony of right-handers once Rachin Ravindra fell. By the time Santner and Neesham, the left-handers, emerged, the match was as good as dusted.
Using up half your cheat code
Having the world’s best bowler does not guarantee wins, of course: it is important for a team to optimally use his four overs.
India typically use Bumrah in two spells of one over each before recalling him for two overs at the death. Here, after India got three wickets in five overs (Bumrah had obviously struck with the first ball), the cameras panned to Gautam Gambhir signalling to Surya to give Bumrah his second over.
The intention was obvious. Tim Seifert, on 31 from 15 balls, was looking dangerous, and was probably New Zealand’s best bet to chase down that mountain of a target: India wanted him to get him and “close out” the match. Bumrah did not dismiss Seifert, but he conceded only five, the asking rate climbed to 14.57, and the scoreboard pressure mounted even further.
